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Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount
Laurel (Mount Laurel II)I has been characterized as "the most important zoning opinion since Euclid"; 2 "one of the strongest constitutional
court decisions since the civil desegregation decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court"; 3 and a decision likely to involve the judiciary in "an
undesirable intrusion on the home rule principle."-4 While personal
opinion as to the merits of Mount Laurel II may vary, both supporters
and critics of the decision acknowledge that it has dramatically altered the regulation of land use by local governments in New Jersey.
That the changes occasioned by Mount Laurel II could be so
significant in a state whose courts were pioneers in the area of exclusionary zoning during the past decade gives some measure of the
extraordinary forcefulness and thoroughness of this New Jersey Supreme Court decision. While of course not binding on jurisdictions
outside New Jersey, it is likely to influence decisions in other states,
particularly those which are heavily urbanized.
One of the apparent differences between Mount Laurel II and its
predecessor decisions is the litigation which it has spawned. Whereas
in the past, public interest groups-including most notably the New
Jersey Department of the Public Advocate-have carried a large burden of the judicial battle against exclusionary zoning, in the sixteen
months since Mount Laurel II was decided, over seventy-five cases
have been brought against local governments by private property
owners or developers. To be sure, the Mount Laurel II court tailored
the builder's remedy to elicit assistance from the home building industry in compelling municipal compliance. One wonders, however,
whether the court could have predicted quite how successful it would
be.
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This Symposium on Mount Laurel II is particularly opportune in
light of the national ramifications of the decision itself and the fact
that much of the current Mount Laurel litigation involves the builder's remedy. Indeed, the issues involved in post-Mount Laurel II
zoning are complex and, through continuing review by the three
regional judges appointed to hear all subsequent exclusionary zoning
cases, are constantly evolving. The articles herein cover a wide range
of these issues, including various perspectives on the historical progression of the Mount Laurel doctrine and its social, political, and judicial
influences.
Stanley Van Ness, Commissioner of the Department of the Public
Advocate under Governor Byrne, provides an insightful perspective
on the legal, political, and social considerations which shaped the
Mount Laurel doctrine over the past decade and a half. He reflects on
the Public Advocate's activism in the exclusionary zoning area during
his tenure. Moreover, he measures the impact of this involvement on
the provision of affordable housing for lower income households in
general and for racial minorities in particular.
Professor Jerome Rose "defines" a handful of new legal concepts
invoked in Mount Laurel II and in the process describes the particular
complications of each in relation to constitutional, fiscal, administrative, political, and socioeconomic issues. Although individually defined, the aggregate of the concepts selected-principles of sound
planning, affirmative measures, overzoning, mandatory set-asides,
least cost housing, suitability, builder's remedy, excessive restrictions
and exactions-provide for a comprehensive discussion of the current
state of affairs of Mount Laurel litigation and implementation. In
characteristic style, Professor Rose concludes by positing three additional terms- "constitutional brinkmanship," "skillful municipal obstinacy" and "waning judicial legitimacy"-by which he expresses
distress with the course the New Jersey Supreme Court has taken in
Mount Laurel II.
Professor John Payne explores the process of judicial decisionmaking in Mount Laurel II through a review of the recordings of oral
arguments before the supreme court in October and December of
1980. He sets the historical context within what he describes as the
"Mount Laurel I Trilogy"'5 and discusses the unique framework speci-
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fied by the court for the presentation of the six consolidated cases.
Using excerpts from the oral argument, he analyzes the extent to
which the decision recognizes a constitutional right to housing and the
basis for the court's choices of remedies in post-Mount Laurel II cases.
In A Black Perspective on Mount Laurel II: Toward a Black
"FairShare," Robert Holmes expands upon the significance of Mount
Laurel II to the black community. Beginning with the first Mount
Laurel decision, he notes that the court's definition of the protected
class was in terms of economic conditions, not racial characteristics.
Based on demographic data from the 1980 Census, Mr. Holmes identifies circumstances under which blacks and other minorities may not
share equally with white families of lower income in gaining access to
any affordable housing produced as a result of Mount Laurel II. He
proposes criteria for selecting residents of such housing which would
maximize equal access to all members of the protected class, and with
conscientious monitoring, would avoid the necessity of additional
litigation concerning the specific rights of the minority poor.
Gerald Meisel identifies and analyzes the critical issues which
must be addressed by any prospective Mount Laurel litigant, whether
builder, public interest group, or municipality. In so doing he provides a thorough discussion of the substantial planning and zoning
changes created by Mount Laurel II and their possible impact on
interested parties. Of particular interest to those concerned with the
maintenance of affordable housing over time is Mr. Meisel's proposal
for the establishment of public trusts to govern resale and rerental of
lower income dwelling units. This use of public trusts is likely to be
the subject of increasing interest as obstacles to constructing affordable housing are surmounted and attention is focused on occupancy.
The dust from the decision on January 20, 1983 has not yet
settled. More issues remain unaddressed than resolved at this point in
the post-Mount Laurel II era. The process is becoming more predictable-for local government and builders alike-but only barely so. The
municipal fair share obligation and the acceptable responses for its
satisfaction must become more predictable and consistent in order to
achieve broad-based compliance by well-intentioned municipalities
and to assure the actual provision of housing for lower income persons.
This Symposium should assist in this effort through the exchange
of ideas and concerns of five well-respected and knowledgeable authors. Hopefully, when the dust does settle it will come to rest not on
stacks of trial briefs filed by both sides in exclusionary zoning litigation, but on the rooftops of newly constructed, lower income dwellings.

